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Abstract
Stock return volatilities are related to firms' financial status. Financially constrained firms are
more volatile. Their stock return volatilities react more negatively to lagged return changes
than financially unconstrained firms. This strong negative relation between volatilities and
lagged returns for financially constrained firms are not affected by industry differences or
firm leverage. Moreover, the debt-equity ratio is not as important as financial constraints for
the firm-level risk-return relation.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Evidence suggests that firms could be financially constrained (Fazzari et.al., 
1988). Firms’ investment decisions might be more sensitive to internal cash flows 
when firms face external financial constraints. Financial constraints might also affect 
stock returns. Lamont et.al. (2001) construct an index of financial constraints based on 
regression coefficient estimates in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). They find that 
financially constrained firms have low average stock returns. Using an alternative 
estimation method, Whited and Wu (2006) find that financially constrained firms earn 
a positive but insignificant average return.   
In this paper, I study the impact of firms’ external financial status on firms 
return volatility.  The paper differs from the previous literature in two regards. First, 
instead of examining the impact of financial status on firms’ investment decisions or 
stock returns, the paper emphasizes on the impact of financial constraints on firms’ 
total risk. Whether financial constraints as a whole is a systematic factor or an 
idiosyncratic risk, firms with higher degree of financial constraints would have higher 
total risk. In the paper, I use two measures of firm-level financial constraints. One is 
constructed using a discriminant analysis method. The other is based on the modified 
coefficient estimates as in Lamont et.al. (2001). 
Secondly, this study estimates the model in the framework of Christie (1982) 
and Duffee (1995) in examining the relation between firm-level volatilities and lagged 
returns. One particular feature about stock return volatilities is that firm-level 
volatilities tend to be negatively correlated with lagged stock returns. This 
phenomenon, the so-called asymmetric volatility, has been explained by the leverage 
effect, i.e., a drop in the value of the stock increases financial leverage, which makes 
the stock riskier and increases its volatility
1. However, previous studies on firm-level 
asymmetric volatility have mainly emphasized on the effect of leverage. By examining 
the role of financial constraints, this study could potentially shed more light on the 
issue of the negative relation between firm-level volatilities and lagged returns. 
The study finds that financial constraints contribute to the negative relation 
between volatilities and lagged returns. Financially constrained firms have higher 
stock return volatilities, their volatilities also react stronger (negatively) to lagged 
stock returns. Moreover, the contribution of financial constraints to firm volatility is 
significant and independent of other possible factors such as industry effects and 
leverage effects. As a result, financial constraints magnify the negative relation 
between firm-level volatilities and lagged returns. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the 
estimation design and the data. Section 3 presents and interprets the estimation results 
and section 4 concludes.   
2. Data and the Model 
2.1. The Model 
This study specifies the volatility and the return relation as that in Duffee (1995) 
and French et.al. (1987): 
                                                 
1  A competing theory, the volatility feedback hypothesis, has been proposed to explain the asymmetric 
volatility. However, this hypothesis is mostly tested using the aggregate stock market data.(French et.al. 
1987 and Campbell and Hentschel 1992).  2
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where  it V  is the monthly volatility of firm  i at time t,  1 it R −  is the monthly return 
of firm i  at time  1 t −  and λ  represents the relation between the lagged stock 
return and the volatility. The paper follows French et.al. (1987), Schwert (1989), and 
Schwert and Seguin (1990) in using daily data within each month to construct the 








= ∑ ,  t N  is the number of trading days in the 
month t, and  itj r   is the daily return of firm i for day j in month t. In the literature,  λ  
is typically negative.   
There is evidence that financial constraints might be one of the factors 
contributing to stock returns. For the purpose, if there is a financial constraints factor, 
the stock return volatilities of firms should be higher for firms with financial 
constraints. If the financial constraints factor does not exist, then changes in firms’ 
financial status represent firm-specific shocks, which affect firm volatilities as well. To 
examine the impact of financial constraints, the following equation is estimated: 
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where firms are divided into three groups, the financially constrained, unconstrained 
and the less constrained.  FC D  equals 1 if the firm belongs to the financially 
constrained group and 0 otherwise;  UC D  equals 1 if the firm belongs to the 
unconstrained group and 0 otherwise. Thus, a negative  2 β  indicates that financially 
constrained firms have stronger negative relation between volatilities and lagged 
returns.  
2.2. The Data 
The sample of companies used in the analysis is restricted to the following 
industry groups and their respective SIC codes: agricultural, mining, forestry fish and 
construction with SIC codes 1-1999, manufacture with SIC codes 2000-2999, retail 
and wholesale trade with SIC codes 5000-5999, and services with SIC codes 
7000-8999. Financial and utility companies are not in the sample.   
The CRSP daily stock file is used to calculate monthly stock return volatilities 
and monthly returns from the CRSP monthly file are used as monthly returns. Every 
firm’s financial status data from Compustat is matched each year with the return and 
volatility series from July of that year to June of next year from the CRSP file. The 
reason is that most of the annual financial reports are not filed till several months after 
the New Year; the indicator for firms’ financial status thus corresponds to the return 
and volatility several months later. The study requires firms with at least five year’s 
financial constraints data and forty-eight monthly volatility observations. It also 
requires that the number of missing monthly volatility observations in each firm’s time 
series not greater than four. Such requirement helps eliminate firms with short-lived 
history while include as many firms as possible.   
The final sample consists of 5782 firms diversified across industries. The time 
horizon ranges from July 1963 to June 1999. The firm with the minimum length of 
period has 48 months of records and the maximum length of time has 432 months of 
records. On average firms have 162 monthly volatility-return observations.    3
2.3. Financial Constraints 
The study uses two methods to construct firms’ financial status. First, the paper 
uses a quasi-discriminant analysis method to determine firms’ financial status. The 
discriminant analysis, as a dimension-reduction method, is widely used in the literature 
to predict bankruptcy and financial distress. Similar method has been used by Cleary 
(1999) to distinguish different levels of financial constraints on a much smaller dataset. 
Second, firms’ financial status is calculated by following Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
and Lamont et.al. (2001) which provides a robustness check.   
The first step of the discriminant analysis is to construct several mutually 
exclusive groups of firms according to their dividend payout behavior. Annual 
dividend payout is widely accepted as one of the most revealing indicators of how well 
firms’ internal finances are
2. An initiation or increase in dividend payout is a good sign 
that the firm is not in financial constraints and vice versa. Firms are divided into 3 
groups each year according to their financial status. Group 1 is the dividend-increasing, 
group 2 is the dividend-unchanged and group 3 is the dividend-decreasing group. 
Group 2 also includes those firm-years before the dividend payout initiation. Although 
dividend changes can be very revealing of firm’s financial status, dividend no-change 
is not a clear signal of how well firms’ finance situation is. So Group 2 will not be 
used as the basis for the initial step of the discriminant analysis. 
Five financial ratios are constructed using data from firms’ previous-year 
annual reports: debt/equity ratio (DR), cash flow to net fixed assets (CF), net income 
margin (IS), sales growth (SG), and market/book value (MB).
3  The assumption is that 
these variables can predict whether a firm will raise, or reduce dividend payout in the 
next period.   
With these variables, I can perform the discriminant analysis and establish a 
linear relation between independent discriminant variables and a discriminant score. 
The higher the discriminant score is, the more likely that the firm is unconstrained and 
vise versa. Every year, firms are re-ranked according to their discriminant scores and 
the highest one-third firms are defined as unconstrained (UC), the lowest one-third as 
constrained (FC), and the middle-one third firms as less constrained (LFC).   
Table 1 presents the mean statistic of the sample. Firms with high sale growth 
rate, high cash flow to net fixed assets, high net income margin, low debt-equity ratio 
and low market-book value have high discriminant scores. Firms with low 
discriminant scores are financially constrained.   
As a robustness check, I use revised KZ index coefficient estimates provided in 
Lamont et.al. (2001) to construct another measure of financial constraints, the KZ 
index.  The two classifications are quite consistent and detailed comparison is 
available upon request. 
3. Estimation Results 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the impact of financial constraints 
on firm-level volatility. The regression equations (1) and (2) are estimated using the 
panel regression method allowing for the first-order autocorrelation.   
                                                 
2 For example, Fazzari et.al. (1988) classify firms into the following three groups based on their 
dividend behavior over the 1970-1984 period: (1) those that have dividend-income ratio less than 0.10 
for at least 10 years; (2) those that have dividend-income ratio between 0.10 to 0.20 for at least 10 years; 
and (3) all other firms. 
3  Details of these variables are described in the Appendix. Variables are also winsorized to approximate 
normality.  4
3.1. Basic Results 
The results from Table 2 show that all groups of firms have negative relations 
between volatilities and lagged returns, consistent with the literature on asymmetric 
volatility (Duffee 1995). However, the return coefficients differ according to their 
financial status. The unconstrained group has the smallest return coefficient in absolute 
value at -0.028. For the LFC (FC) group, the coefficients are -0.0377 (-0.085). Thus, 
the higher the financial constraints level is, the more the volatility increases given the 
same amount of the decline in lagged returns.   
To test whether the observed coefficients difference is statistically significant, 
two dummy variables are introduced:  FC D  equals 1 if the firm belongs to the 
financially constrained group and 0 otherwise;  UC D   equals 1 if the firm belongs to the 
unconstrained group and 0 otherwise. The results are shown in Table 2 under the 
column of total sample.    The coefficient for the interaction between  FC D  and  lagged 
returns is -0.0512 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating 
volatilities from financially constrained firms react stronger to drops in stock prices. 
The coefficient for the  FC D  dummy itself is 0.0132 and statistically significant at the 
1 percent level, suggesting financially constrained firms also have higher volatility. On 
the other hand, the coefficient for the  UC D  dummy is -0.006 and statistically 
significant, suggesting that unconstrained firms have lower risk. The regression yields 
similar results if all data are included in the regressions.   
The same regressions are conducted using the KZ index. Table 3 shows the 
results. The lagged return coefficient of the financially constrained group is -0.0686 
and significantly different from that of other groups of firms. The coefficient for the 
FC D   dummy is 0.0126 and statistically significant. Therefore, the test results using the 
KZ index generate similar results as those using the discriminant analysis method.   
Overall, the results show that financially constrained firms are more volatile 
than firms with less financial constraints. Financial constraints also magnify the 
negative relation between volatilities and lagged returns.   
3.2. Industry Factor 
   Different industries could have different capital structures and may as a result 
have different financial status. To examine whether the results above differ across 
industries, the sample is classified into 4 subgroups according to industry affiliations, 
Group 1 represents agriculture, forestry, mining and construction firms with SIC code 
of 1-1999; Group 2, manufacturing firms with code of 2000-3999; Group 3, wholesale 
and retail trade firms with code of 5000-5999; and Group 4, service firms with SIC of 
7000-8999.  
Table 4 shows that the general negative relation between volatilities and lagged 
returns still holds well across 4 groups of firms. Within each group, the financially 
constrained group has significantly higher sensitivity coefficient for lagged returns. 
Financial constraints also contribute significantly to the overall volatility as indicated 
by higher coefficients for the  FC D  dummies. On the other hand, financially 
unconstrained firms have significantly lower volatilities.   
Therefore, results suggest that the effect of financial constraints on the 
volatility-lagged return relation does not depend on industry differences.    5
3.3. Leverage Effect 
One of the hypotheses for the negative relation between volatilities and lagged 
returns is the leverage hypothesis. Declines in stock prices increase firms’ financial 
leverage (debt to equity ratio), which makes stocks riskier and raises their volatilities. 
One possibility that financially constrained firms have high volatility-lagged 
return sensitivity and higher volatility might be that those firms have high 
debt-to-equity (D/E) ratios. To examine whether results above can be explained by 
D/E ratios, I divide firms into three groups based on their D/E ratios: high, mid, and 
low D/E groups each year with one third of the firms in each group.   
If the effect of financial constraints is captured by debt to equity ratios, the high 
D/E ratio firms should have higher group-wide volatility level and stronger reaction to 
lagged return changes. Moreover, the coefficient for the interaction term between the 
FC D   dummy and lagged returns should be either insignificant or significantly smaller 
for high D/E firms than that in Table 2. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results for three D/E groups. For the lagged 
returns coefficients, the high D/E group has the largest coefficient at -0.0316. 
Statistically, it is different from the coefficients for the low D/E group and the mid D/E 
group (results are available upon request). On the other hand, within each D/E groups, 
the coefficients for the  FC D  dummies are still positive, and statistically significant. 
The coefficients for the interaction term between the  FC D  dummy and the lagged 
return are negative and statistically significant. For the high (low) D/E group, the 
coefficient is -0.0508 (-0.0601). These numbers are not that different from the 
coefficient number (-0.0512) in Table 2. Thus, the effect of financial constraints is 
independent of the leverage effect as represented by debt-equity ratios.   
Panel B of Table 5 provides additional results by combining the  FC D  dummy, 
the high D/E dummy ( HDE D ) and their interactions with lagged returns in the same 
regression. The results show that the  FC D  dummy coefficient (0.0144) is twice as 
large as the high D/E dummy coefficient (0.0071). It also shows that the coefficient of 
the interaction term between  FC D   and the lagged return (-0.0536) is almost 6 times as 
large as that for the high D/E interaction term (-0.009). Therefore, between the 
debt-equity ratio and financial constraints, the financial constraints effect is more 
important statistically. 
4. Conclusions 
   This paper studies whether financially constrained firms are more risky and 
whether financial constraints magnify the risk-lagged return relation. In light of recent 
studies of financial constraints on stock returns by Lamont et. al. (2001) and Whited 
and Wu (2006), and continuing research in asymmetric volatility pioneered by Black 
(1976) and Christie (1982), I link firms’ stock return volatility to their financial status 
and examine the volatility-lagged return relation empirically. Based on two indices for 
financial constraints, it is found that firms with financial constraints are more risky. 
Such high riskiness is shown both in overall level of volatility and in volatility 
sensitivity to lagged return changes. Moreover, the effect of financial constraints is 
independent of other factors such as industry differences and leverage in explaining 
firm-level stock return volatility. It might be interesting for future research to examine 
why financial constraints magnify the negative relation between volatility and the 
lagged return in more detail.  6
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The financial ratio variables are calculated using the data from the annual Computat 
data file: Assets-Total (data6), Property, plant and Equipment (Net) (data8), 
Long-Term Debt-Total (data9), Sale (Net) (data12), Depreciation and Amortization 
(data14), Income Before Extraordinary Items (data18), Price-Calender Year-Close 
(data24), Common Shares Outstanding (data25), Debt in Current Liabilities (data34), 
Common Equity-Total (data60), and Net Income (data172). The ratios are calculated 
as follows:   
(1) debt/equity ratio (DR) = (data9+data34)/data6;   
(2) cash flow to net fixed assets (CF) = (data18+data14)/data8;   
(3) net income margin (IS) = data172/data12;   
(4) sales growth (SG) = (data12-lagged data12)/lagged data12;   
(5) market/book value (MB) = data24*data25/data60;   
The discriminant score of firm i at year t,  it D , is calculated based on the following 
equation, the coefficients are the results of the discriminant analysis:   
it t-1 t-1 t-1 t-1 D 0 7658 SG 0 3972 CF 3 2186 IS 0 3781 DR 0 1884 MB =. ∗ +. ∗ +. ∗ −. ∗ −. ∗  
By construction, the firms with high sale growth rate, high cash flow, high income 
margin, low debt-equity ratio and low market-book value will have high discriminant 
scores, and tend to be less financially constrained; the firms with low discriminant 
scores are financially constrained firms.    8
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of selected financial variables 
 
The financially constrained group is represented by FC, the less financially constrained, 
LFC and financially unconstrained, UC. MC is the market capitalization. DR is the 
debt/equity ratio. CF is the cash flow to net fixed assets. SG is the sales growth. IS is 
the net income margin. MB is the market/book value and D-score is the discriminant 
score. 
 
 Total  Sample UC LFC FC 
MC($m) 899.78 906.63 1343.82 480.51 
DR 0.43 0.31 0.46 0.53 
CF 0.30 0.76 0.33 -0.19 
SG(%) 0.15 0.31 0.11 0.01 
IS 0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.09 
MB 2.41 2.53 1.81 2.85 
D-score -0.22 0.41 -0.11 -0.97  9
Table 2: Regression results for volatility and financial constraints 
 
The regression is either    t it it R V ε λ α + + = − 1    
or  t it UC UC it FC FC it it R D D R D D R V ε β β β β λ α + ∗ + + ∗ + + + = − − − 1 4 3 1 2 1 1 with 
fixed-effect panel regressions allowing for first-order autocorrelations.  FC D  and  UC D  
are the dummy variables for the financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
respectively.    UC, LFC and FC are the unconstrained, less constrained and financially 
constrained groups.    T-statistics are in the parentheses. One asterisk and two asterisks 
represent significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. All data 
column is the regression based on all the available data in Compustat and CRSP, some 
of which do not survive the sample selection process. 
 
  UC group LFC group FC group Total Sample  All Data
1 − it R    -0.0280 -0.0377 -0.0850 -0.0535 -0.0307 -0.0326
 (-45.77**) (-47.87**) (-34.54**) (-53.07**) (-14.28**) (15.40**)
FC D   0.0132 0.0170
 (23.36**) (24.18**)
FC D * 1 − it R   -0.0512 -0.0731
 (-19.68**) (-28.92**)
UC D   -0.0060 -0.0082
 (-10.30**) (-11.64**)
UC D * 1 − it R   0.0056 0.0005
 (1.94) (0.18)
Number of firms  4,846 4,593 4,787 5,782 5,782 7797
Number of obs.  304,565 305,000 289,540 907,552 907,552 1,142,998
 
  10
Table 3: Regressions based on the KZ index classification method 
 
The regressions are conducted using the KZ index classification for financial 
constraints (1997). T-statistics are in the parentheses. 
 
  UC group LFC group FC group Total Sample
1 − it R    -0.0430 -0.0416 -0.0686 -0.0366
 (-45.46**) (-42.58**) (-27.36**) (-17.73**)
FC D   0.0126
 (18.88**)
FC D * 1 − it R   -0.0364
 (-14.14**)
UC D   -0.0050
 (-7.28**)
UC D * 1 − it R   -0.0032
  (-1.12)
Number of Firms  3,738 4,284 3,973 5,750
Number of Obs.  294.966 291,708 280,663 873,585 11
Table 4: Industry factors and financial constraints 
 
Group 1: agriculture, forestry and mining; Group 2: manufacturing; Group 3: 
wholesale and retail trade; and Group 4: services. T-statistics are in the parentheses. 
One asterisk and two asterisks represent significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent 
level respectively. 
   
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
1 − it R    -0.0528 -0.0255 -0.0492 -0.0384
 (-5.95**) (-9.53**) (-16.15**) (-4.67**)
FC D   0.0171 0.0113 0.0135 0.0189
 (7.25**) (17.32**) (11.36**) (8.10**)
FC D * 1 − it R   -0.0289 -0.0535 -0.0290 -0.0500
 (-2.83**) (-16.32**) (-7.35**) (-5.37**)
UC D   -0.0067 -0.0048 -0.0064 -0.0091
 (-2.96**) (-7.21**) (-4.72**) (-3.99**)
UC D * 1 − it R   0.0314 0.0016 0.0190 -0.0119
 (2.93**) (0.44) (4.08**) (-1.17)
Number of firms  506 3,461 872 943
Number of obs.  75,801 587,821 129,359 114,571
  12
Table 5: Leverage effect and financial constraints 
 
Panel A: each year firms are classified into high debt/equity (D/E) group, mid D/E 
group and low D/E group. T-statistics are in the parentheses and one asterisk and two 
asterisks represent significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
  Low D/E Group Mid D/E Group High D/E Group
1 − it R    -0.0263 -0.0230 -0.0316
 (-9.03**) (-10.38**) (-5.54**)
FC D   0.0082 0.0071 0.0162
 (9.05**) (10.91**) (11.33**)
FC D * 1 − it R   -0.0601 -0.0471 -0.0508
 (-16.58**) (-15.99**) (-7.71**)
UC D   -0.0048 -0.0028 -0.0088
 (-6.74*) (-3.94**) (-4.75**)
UC D * 1 − it R   0.0059 0.0004 0.0021
 (1.60) (-0.12) (0.25)
Number of Firms  4,052 4,245 3,761





Panel B:  t it HDE HDE it FC FC it it R D D R D D R V ε θ θ θ θ λ α + ∗ + + ∗ + + + = − − − 1 4 3 1 2 1 1  where 
FC D  equals 1 when the firm is financially constrained and 0 otherwise; and  HDE D  
equals 1 when the firm has a high debt-equity ratio and 0 otherwise.   
 
 Coefficient t-statistics  P-value
1 − it R      -0.0231 -13.56 0.000
FC D   0.0144 26.96 0.000
FC D * 1 − it R   -0.0536 -23.70 0.000
HDE D   0.0071 11.23 0.000
HDE D * 1 − it R   -0.0090 -3.92 0.000
 